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This paper analyses the characteristics of low-income savers in a working class 
residential area of Cape Town. It uses the Khayelitsha and Mitchell’s Plain 
Survey that was conducted in 2000. The survey was done at both a household 
and individual level for all adults over 18 years old. These household and 
individual datasets were merged to form the dataset used in this study. There 
were 4984 respondents of which 2644 were adults .The KMPS data set is a good 
foundation for analysing the characteristics of savers in a low income area 
characterised by high unemployment and poverty. 
 
Economic theory defines savings as that part of disposable income that is not 
consumed (McConnel Brue, 1999: 178). The microfinance literature tends to 
focus on the importance of the demand of the poor for credit rather than on the 
importance of savings per se. However there is a relationship between savings 
and the demand for credit. Savings builds up a lump sum of money which can be 
accessed in the future, whereas credit gives a person immediate access to the 
lump sum which is paid off by future savings (Moyo. et al, 2002: 6). Both 
savings and credit are a means by which the poor are able to access a lump of 
money that is greater than their average expected weekly or monthly income 
when the need arises. Matin et al (2002) argue that these needs can be grouped 
into three categories; life cycle needs, emergencies and opportunities (Matin et 
al,  2002: 276). For the purposes of this study, savings are understood as 
foregone monetary consumption. Of course the definition of savings could be 
expanded to include foregone consumption of food and goods. Thus the 
purchase of a durable good could be considered as a savings form (but only if it 
was not purchased on a hire purchase scheme), as would the delayed 
consumption of a bag of mealie meal. Such forms of savings are not considered 
here as the KMPS does not ask sufficient questions in this regard. 
 
During the life cycle of most people there are many occasions that demand a 
capital outlay that exceeds their weekly or monthly income. Occasions such as 
weddings, funerals or purchasing or building a house require the poor to have 
access to a lump sum of money that has either been created by previous savings 
or is supplied through a loan. Life-cycle needs are a predictable and often  
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predetermined event in a person's life and may take place regardless of whether 
a person can or cannot afford to fund it through their own current income. If 
they do not have sufficient savings they will try to borrow to pay for the event or 
purchase.  
 
Crises are unpredicted events which may demand a sum of money that exceeds 
average income. These expenditure shocks include loss of property by fire, 
flooding or theft or the death of the principal wage-earner in the household.   
Often in times of crisis, accessing a lump sum is a matter of the day-to-day 
survival of the poor (Matin et al, 2002:277). Opportunities arise when the poor, 
through spending a lump sum, have a chance of bettering their lot in life by 
expanding their business or moving to a safer area. Again the lump sum required 
in these times exceeds that which the poor individual would usually have at 
hand. Savings therefore acts as an insurance medium for the very poor in that it 
provides a lump sum of money when life-cycle events, emergencies or 
opportunities require it (Baumann, 2003: 8).  
 
It is sometimes argued that the South African poor do not save as every 
increment of their income is needed for their day-to day survival (Matin et al, 
2002, 276). Others have shown that the poor do indeed save, albeit often in 
small amounts (Porteous 2003, Verhoef 2002). This study comes to similar 
findings, but goes further than the existing literature by analysing different 
forms of savings.  
 
Recently there has been some debate surrounding the banking system in South 
Africa. The biggest criticism has been that the South African banking system 
does not provide basic saving services to the poor. 17.6 million adults in South 
Africa do not have a bank account (Porteous.2003. 2). Within the decile of the 
population with the lowest standard of living only 8% had a bank account, 
whereas within the 10% of the population with the highest standard of living, 
91% had access to a bank account (ibid).  
 
This study explores whether these national trends are reflected in the savings 
patterns of the respondents in the KMPS survey. As will be seen later, although 
the majority of the respondents do not use the formal banking sector, the poor do 




2.  Savings in the KMPS 
 
Respondents to the KMPS were asked whether or not they had any of the 
following forms of savings: bank savings, stokvel savings, burial society savings 
and other savings.  Following this question they were asked to disclose the 
amount of money they saved in each category. This presented a problem for data 
analysis because some respondents were inconsistent when answering these 
qualitative and quantitative questions. Twenty- two respondents indicated that 
they did not save money in any of the above savings categories) but then 
reported some sum of money that they put into that savings form each month. In 
the analysis, all individuals that reported having a positive amount of money 
saved were regarded as savers. 
 
This analysis is focused specifically on reported savings and will attempt to see 
where people save and what determine why a person in the KMPS will prefer to 
save in one saving form as opposed to another.  Some respondents may indeed 
have saved yet did not disclose the amount of their savings. For ease of analysis 
these observationS were regarded as being non-savers. A significant problem 
was that two hundred and thirty eight adult respondents reported having no 
personal income, yet they indicated that they had positive savings. This could be 
a problem with the data set or could reflect that some individuals saved using the 
earnings of others. 
 
Two hundred and forty three respondents said that their total household savings 
was greater than their total reported household income. This perhaps indicates a 
double counting problem, where different members of a household report the 
same savings item. What was fascinating about this was that some respondents 
in the same household reported saving the same amount in savings schemes that 
covered the entire family. This would occur where only one contribution per 
household was made to a particular scheme, say a burial society, but each 
member of the household would report that they were making that saving. Thus 
the aggregated total household savings variable would be an inflated figure as it 
was impossible for respondents to distinguish between whether they were saving 
on behalf of the entire household or whether they were saving individually. 
When dealing with the KMPS data set there was a continuous struggle to 
distinguish between the savings and income of an individual and that of the 
entire household. 
 
One thousand two hundred and twenty nine people disclosed that they had 
positive personal savings.  The mean savings was R198.03 and the highest 
amount saved was R6400.  Of these respondents, 990 reported having a positive 
personal income. The mean household savings of positive household savers was 
R301.59. One thousand nine hundred and twenty- one adults in the KMPS  
  4








































reported living in a household that had at least one form of savings. The highest 
household saving was also R6400. 53% of the adult respondents indicated that 
they did not save at all. The most common savings method by far was through 
contributing to a burial society only, whereas the next common savings category 
was saving in both a bank and burial society. 
 
Table 1: Saving forms 
 
 
The banking sector had substantial penetration as 31% of savers indicated 
having at least some savings in a bank. Although burial societies were the most 
common saving category the mean contribution to burial societies was the 
lowest of the four savings forms. The mean burial society savings was R53.48 a 
month, followed by stokvels at R202, then by other saving forms at R251.16 and 
then as expected by banks which had a mean monthly contribution of R312.46.  
Fortunately the kinds of other savings were disclosed in the survey and ranged 
from saving money at the actual household residence, to having a postal bank 
savings account, to more complex financial investments like unit trusts.  These 
other saving forms proved to be relatively unpopular with only 7.4% of 
















Variable Obs  Mean  Std.  Min  Max 
Burial society savings  1015 R  53.48 64.07765  1  790 
Stokvel savings  236  R 200 254.7354 1 2500 
Other' savings  91  R 251.16 298.9595  2  2000 
Bank savings  381 R  312.46  486.4964 1.5 6000 
Personal savings  1229  R 198.03 405.1869  1  6400 
Household savings  1921 R  301.59 473.4145 5 6400  
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Figure 1 illustrates the relationship between income and the share of each saving 
form as a percentage of total personal savings. Burial society savings take up a 
larger proportion of total savings for poorer people. As income increases, the 
proportion of burial saving to total saving declines. Bank saving as a proportion 
of total saving increases with an increase in income. Stokvels take up an equal 
proportion of total savings regardless of the income level. The use of other 
saving forms seems to only become popular with people in the top two income 
deciles of the population. For the bottom eighty percent ‘other savings forms’, 
range from between two and five percent of total savings. However for the 
richest ten percent of the sample, this figure rises to almost 13 percent of total 
savings. This indicates that once income has gone past a certain threshold, 




3.  The Determinants of Savings 
 
Before making a formal statistical analysis of South African savers, a general 
hypothesis was made about what characteristics of an individual would increase 
the likelihood of them saving. The KMPS provided a wealth of information that 
needed to be whittled down to a savings-specific focus. The three categories of 
characteristics that were thought to influence savings were income and savings 
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3.1  Income and savings of households and individuals 
 
Savings are obviously expected to be a positive function of income. Yet the key 
question that must be addressed is whether savings is a function of individual 
income or of household income. This problem will become clearer in the 
analysis that follows. It is a variant of the problem which concerns all users of 
household income data in South Africa: i.e. to what extent income is shared and 
to what extent is it not. This applies directly to the way we conceptualise 
savings. In the KMPS, total household income could be measured in two ways. 
The first was to use the household survey question Q16 ‘How much income 
comes to the household from all sources in a typical month?’ Alternatively one 
could aggregate all the individual level data pertaining to income in order to 
construct a household income variable. Skordis and Welch (2002) have shown 
that the aggregated variable is a better proxy for overall household income. 
Skordis and Welch constructed a gross  personal income variable. For the 
purposes of this study it was deemed more appropriate to use net income as a 
determinant of savings. Thus a personal net income variable was created from 
the KMPS data. This and other STATA do files are shown in appendix A. 
 
Respondents of the KMPS were asked to disclose various income sources. The 
amount of income that each adult received from these sources was summed to 
form an estimated individual income level. The first step was to determine the 
income levels of those people who participated in the labour force. Nattrass’ 
labour market status definitions (which followed international labour force 
statistical standards) were used (Nattrass 2002: 14-16). Sources of income from 
earnings were categorised as follows, wage income, self-employment profit and 
casual work income. Two categories were created for the other forms of income: 
grant income and income from other sources. 
 
Respondents who recorded a missing answer for any of the above categories 
were regarded as not receiving any income from that particular category. This 
was a key decision in constructing the personal income variable as it necessarily 
meant that only disclosed income was included. People may very well have had 
income from these sources but unless they disclosed the amount they received it 
was not considered for the analysis. The alternative would have been to drop all 
people who had recorded a missing answer for any income variable. This 
however would have resulted in a severe reduction in the sample size. 
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Table 2:  Sources of Income 
 
Variable Obs  Mean  Std.  Min  Max 
Wage income  848  2476  2452.686 25 24500
Profit from Self Employment  164 579.9951 1219.195 5 12000
Casual pay  167  592.1617 583.7912 7  3900 
Grant income  327  490.1198 457.7609 1  5400 
Gift income  506  335.3577 526.9495 5  6000 
Investment income  43  243.807 292.0275 1  1000 
Personal income  2630  1001.377 1841.983  0  24500
Positive personal Income  1726 1525.853 2090.512  1  24500
 
 
Wage income was measured as the total monthly income a respondent received 
through his or her wage employment. If the respondent had a second job this 
was also taken into account.  This variable included total basic wages, 
productivity pay, profit share, bonus payments, piece rate payments and if 
received, a 13
th cheque divided by twelve.  If a respondent received a daily, 
weekly or fortnightly wage, this was converted into an estimated monthly wage. 
Eight hundred and forty eight people reported earning a positive wage income. 
The lowest monthly wage was R25 while the highest wage income was a 
definite outlier; a cleaner whose monthly wage was R800, yet who earned R108 
000 a month working overtime at an hourly wage of R1200! After being 
checked out, nine outliers whose reported hourly overtime wage was greater 
than their total monthly wage were dropped from the sample. The mean positive 
wage income was R2 476 whereas the highest monthly wage income was R24 
500. 
 
Self-employment profit was measured as the net monthly non-wage income 
earnings of a respondent.  Although 218 respondents classified themselves as 
being self-employed only 164 recorded a positive self-employment income. The 
mean self-employment income was R579.99 and the highest monthly self-
employment income was R12 000. Interestingly there was not one observation 
among the self-employed who reported negative net earnings in the KMPS. 
 
Casual work income was measured as the income a respondent earned from all 
casual work during the past month. Although there was no other alternative one 
should be cautious in using this casual work variable, as it is not a foolproof 
proxy for average monthly income over a longer period. Casual work is likely to 
vary from month to month and may have a strong seasonal component (e.g. 
most construction work occurs outside of the rainy season.)The earnings from 
casual work a respondent made in October of 2000 thus cannot be assured to be 
a standard measure of average casual monthly income. The mean casual wage  
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was R592 a month with the highest income earned from casual employment 
being R3 900. 
 
The following types of grants were included in the grant income category: state 
old age pension; disability pension; veteran’s pension; employer’s pension; 
worker’s compensation; state child support grant; private child maintenance 
grant; foster care grant and alimony from a divorced spouse. Income from the 
Unemployment Insurance Fund (UIF) was included in the grant income 
category, even though such income is available for a limited duration. Other 
income sources suffer from similar limitations. i.e. casual income and gift 
income could also be temporary. 
 
The state pension was the most common form of state grant with 108 recipients. 
Eighty- six respondents reported receiving R540, the full value state pension at 
the time. The smallest reported state pension was R203 and the largest was 
R1000.  
 
The most common form of private grant was reported from the recipients of 
private child maintenance income. The smallest sum under this category was 
R40 and the highest R1800. Interestingly, the state grant for child maintenance 
was the only source of reported income for almost 74% of the 230 people who 
reported getting grant income. 
 
Income derived from financial investments or rents and gifts from friends or 
relatives were included under the category other incomes sources. Five hundred 
and six adults out of the sample indicated that they received some form of gift 
income and of these 383 said that they did not have any labour earnings. This is 
an important outcome as it shows that some money is transferred from those 
who are working to those who do not earn any money. Almost two thirds of the 
adult respondents who said they received gift income indicated that it was their 
only income source.  
 
The five categories above; wage income, self -employment income, casual pay, 
grant income and other income were summed to form a total income variable 
(personalincome). One thousand seven hundred and twenty-six reported 
receiving a positive total income. The smallest total monthly income reported 
was R5 and the highest was R24 500. This personal income variable was then 
aggregated to form a household income variable (hhincome). A third variable 
was created to indicate the level of income of other people in the household 
(otherhhincome). 
 
An interesting result arose when constructing the household income variable. 
Ninety-four respondents indicated that their personal savings was greater than  
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the aggregated household income variable. It must be remembered that the 
aggregated household income variable was created as an alternative to the 
household level question, ‘How much income comes to the household from all 
sources in a typical month?’, which was asked of one “knowledgeable adult”. 
The alternative measure aggregated the disclosed personal incomes of household 
members. However this method is not without problems of its own. If 
individuals do not fully disclose their personal income, the aggregated 
household income may be smaller than the household income reported in the 
household questionnaire. Respondents tend either to overstate or understate their 
savings and incomes for a host of reasons. These may include fear of being seen 
as destitute or understating income for fear of the taxman (Wright & Mutesesira, 
2001: 4-5). This incorrect disclosure of income and savings is a constant issue in 
survey analysis. 
 
For the purposes of this study respondents were only dropped from the sample if 
their reported personal savings was greater than both the aggregated household 
income variable and their reported household income to the household 
questionnaire. The reported household income variable was used if the 
aggregated household savings was greater than aggregated household income, 
but less than the reported household income. Under these criteria 15 
observations were dropped from the analysis. 
 
3.2 Personal  characteristics 
 
Age, gender, race, education and household size fall under this category. 
 
Age was expected to have a significant influence on whether or not an 
individual saved. life-cycle theory would suggest that people save in middle age 
in order to prepare for old age when they do not have an income source. This 
may not be the pattern in poor South African communities where there is 
substantial unemployment and the old-age pension provides a significant income 
source for the elderly. 
  
Older people in such areas would have had more exposure to expenditure shocks 
over their life cycle, and thus would be better informed and have more of an 
incentive to save for the future. Age also reduces a person's future income 
generating lifespan and as such provides an incentive to save for the nearer 
future when one does not have an income source. Similarly as will be seen later, 
the cost of a burial is the biggest life-cycle shock for most poor households. As 
such, older people may have an incentive to save in order to reduce the cost to 
their household for their own burial when they die. 
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A female dummy variable was constructed to determine the influence of gender. 
In her 1998 study Buijs (1998; 62) argues that in an area with high 
unemployment, women are the primary care givers for their families and are 
forced to be more financially responsible as it is more difficult for them to 
escape their debt obligations. Men on the other hand do not have such strong 
familial ties and can move to other areas if their debts become too great. It 
would thus be expected that women are more likely to save than men.  
 
There were two dominant racial groups in the KMPS; Coloured and African. Of 
the total sample 3483 people were African and 1462 were classified as being 
coloured. Thirty- three people fell under other racial categories. One might 
expect the cultural differences between different race groups to be reflected in 
their savings rates. Thus a dummy variable ‘Africans’ was constructed 
(African=1, non African =0).  
 
Educated people are expected to be better informed about the merits of saving 
and the danger of getting into debt. Literacy and arithmetic skills would also 
provide basic ‘money knowledge’. The KMPS asked what the highest level of 
education was that a respondent had passed. This data was then put into a new 
dummy variable, with 0 for those who had no education, 1 for those who had 
had a year of schooling, 2 for those who had had two years and so on until 
grade12.  Another dummy variable for grade12 was created. It was of further 
interest to see whether there was a significant difference in the level of savings 
between those who had completed their high schooling and those who had not. 
A dummy variable gr12 was thus constructed. 
 
Household size was expected to have a negative relationship with whether or not 
a person saved. Saving is defined as foregone consumption. Levels of 
consumption are likely to be greater as the number of dependants in a household 
increases thus reducing the accumulation of savings. 
 
3.3  Types of formal employment 
 
Wage employment, self-employment or casual employment provides a source of 
income of which a portion can be saved. Nattrass’ broad labour market status 
variable was used in the analysis. (Nattrass, 2002, 14-18).The sample of the 
population that indicated that they had constant wage employment, casual 
employment in the last six months or were self-employed were considered 
income earners.  Three dummy variables indicating whether respondents had 
positive income from any of these sources were constructed.  The aim of 
creating these variables was to see whether or not those that had a relatively 
stable source of source of income were predicted to have higher savings levels 
than those who did not have such an income source.  
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4.  Modelling Savings and the Characteristics 
of Savers 
 
4.1 OLS  regression 
 
An OLS regression was run with the level of personal savings as the dependant 
variable and the various variables listed above as the independent variables. As 
expected the level of personal income had a strongly significant relationship 
with the level of savings.  The broad model predicted a marginal propensity to 
save of 0.03369 for the KMPS respondents.  
 
The Adjusted R
2 for the broad model was 0.1472. As expected, household size 
proved to have a negative yet insignificant relationship with the level of savings 
(co-efficient: -3.6187) whereas people who were self employed (co-efficient: 
41.9184) or who had wage employment (co-efficient: 75.559) were predicted 
to save more than those who were unemployed. The model predicted that gender 
had an insignificant relationship with the level of personal savings, even though 
it was deemed significant when regressed against personal savings in a model 
that only included race, gender, household size and education. Age proved to be 
significant in the broad model. This indicates that the influence of personal 
income and the savings and income of other household members dominates that 
of gender in determining the level of savings. Race proved significant in the 
broad model, which predicted that Africans were expected to save R59.4153 
more than non-Africans. 
 
The model predicted that the level of savings of other household members (co-
efficient = 0.124453) had a significant relationship with the level of personal 
savings. The high co-efficient for the savings supports the hypothesis that a 
savings culture exists within households that do save. 
 
However there is a problem with this OLS regression. It was suspected that the 
goodness of fit was inflated because of “reflection effects” present in the 
household variables
1. This meant that household size and the savings and 
income of other household members were similar for members of the same 
household. In any particular household, the household members would share 
these same household variables.  
 
                                                           




Imagine a household with five household members: X, Y, Q, R, & S.  The 
savings and income of other household members for person X would prove to be 
closely connected to that of person Y as they would both include persons Q, R 
and S’s income and savings. Therefore these aggregated variables would have a 
substantial degree of overlap. This causes a continuous loop in the regression 
and inflates the predicted influence that these household variables have on the 
dependent variable (level of personal savings).  
 
Table 3: Other Household Savings 
 
Household 1  Savings of other household members 
Member X  (Savings of Y) + (Savings of Q) + (Savings of R) + (Savings of S) 
Member Y  (Savings of X) + (Savings of Q) + (Savings of R) + (Savings of S) 
Member Q  (Savings of X) + (Savings of Y) + (Savings of R) + (Savings of S) 
Member R  (Savings of X) + (Savings of Y) + (Savings of Q) + (Savings of S) 
Member S  (Savings of X) + (Savings of Y) + (Savings of Q) + (Savings of R) 
 
 
An attempt was made to control for this by only regressing the personal savings 
and the income and savings of other household members for one member of 
each household. The results of this controlled regression can be seen below. As 
expected the R
2 of the controlled regression was smaller than that of the 
uncontrolled regression. 
  
Our fears were confirmed. The controlled model proved that the savings of other 
household members was indeed inflated because of these “reflection effects”. 
When restricted to just one member per household, the savings of other 
household members was an insignificant determinant of the level of personal 
savings. Thus the household variables could not be used in the final regression. 
A further model that discarded these household variables was thus constructed. 
The only substantial difference between this model and the broad model was 
that the variable FEMALE proved to be significant in the model that did not 
include the household effects. In this model females were predicted to save 
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4.2 Logistic  model 
 
The OLS seemed to be a good indicator of what determined individual savings 
levels. However it could not address a key question: What determines whether 
an individual saves at all? It is unsurprising that the model predicts that a 
respondent would need a high level of income to have a high level of savings. 
However, as can be seen in Figure 3, many (i.e. 732) respondents in the KMPS 
had a positive income and did not save at all. The OLS could not account for 
these non-savers that appeared in the higher income categories. Further 
investigation was needed to see what characteristics determined what made a 
particular respondent save at all. To do this a Logistic model was constructed. 
 



















A binary variable ‘saver’ was constructed with a value of 1 if a person had 
positive total savings. A Logistic model was then used to see whether the 
independent variables listed earlier could determine the probability of a person 
saving. In order to be consistent with the earlier OLS model, a controlled model 
was constructed to see whether reflection effects made the aggregated household 
variables insignificant influences on the decision to save. Again the controlled 
model proved that this was indeed the case. However this meant that both the 
OLS model and the Logistic model could not support the hypothesis that the 238 
people who reported having no personal income yet had positive savings were 
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Interestingly education and the gr12 variables proved to be insignificants 
determinants of the likelihood that a person saved.   A further logistic model was 
constructed that left out both the aggregated household variables and the 
education variables.  
 
In the model that excluded the household variables personal income proved to 
be significant as expected. However, the marginal effects that changes in 
personal income had on the probability that someone would save was quite 
small. The model predicted that if all other variables were kept constant at their 
current levels, the odds of a person saving would increase by 2% with a R100 
increase in personal income. This is a powerful result. Given that the average 
personal income of the KMPS respondents was just over R1000, a large increase 
in income did not have a particularly great influence on the decision to save.  
This shows the pressures that the KMPS community is under to consume. Any 
additional increase in income does not substantially alter one’s decision to save. 
 
Age, gender and income earner categories were also strongly significant. The 
model predicted that a 10- year increase in age would increase the odds of a 
person saving by 33%. The model predicted that the odds of females saving 
were 41% higher than that of males saving. Africans were predicted to be 35% 
more likely to save than non-Africans. 
 
The OLS model predicted that females were predicted to save R22.42 less than 
males. However the Logistic model predicted that the odds of females saving are 
41% higher than that of males. This would indicate that income levels, which 
are influenced by gender factors, determine the levels of savings. Women, when 
given the chance do save. However their lower income levels mean that they 
save less than men. 
 
The odds of saving for households whose only source of income came from 
government and private grants (grant only) were predicted to be 41% lower than 
those households who had income from other sources.  Having formal 
employment was by far the greatest determinant of the likelihood that a person 
saved. The wage employed, self- employed and casual workers were predicted 
to be 148% ,160%  and 70% higher odds of saving respectively than those who 
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By using a combination of OLS and Logistic regression, the analysis was able to 
shed light on the determinants of the decision to save and the level of that 
savings. The next step in the analysis was to get a more informed understanding 
of the three main savings categories, burial societies, banks and stokvels. By 
analysing whether there were any obvious differences in the characteristics of 
the people who saved in these categories, a better understanding of what 
determined whether or not a person saved and why they chose to save in a 
particular way, could be found.  
 
 
5. Burial  Societies 
 
In their seminal paper on the subject, Thompson and Posel argue that people join 
burial societies in order to ensure that they have sufficient funds to pay for an 
appropriate funeral for deceased family members (2002:2). Roth (2000) argued 
that the households surveyed in his paper spent more than 15 times their mean 
monthly income on a funeral. The cost of a funeral is clearly one of the biggest 
life-cycle expenditure shocks facing poor people in South Africa. 
 
 In the South African context, the provision of a funeral of a relative is often an 
indication of social status. Often the funeral ceremony, the coffin and the 
catering for the funeral guests costs more than what the bereaved family can 
afford (Verhoef.2002: 22). Membership of a burial society provides sufficient 
funds to pay for a socially acceptable funeral. Porteous estimates that 7.4 million 
South African adults are members of a burial society (Porteous.2003: 5). It must 
be noted that the motive behind contributing to a burial society saving scheme is 
purely a way of buffeting the impact of a life-cycle shock, namely the death of a 
family member. Saving in a burial society is in no way meant to be a means of 
accumulating capital so as to pay for a new capital investment or as a means of 
bettering one's financial position. 
 
Table 6: Statistics of KMPS burial society savers 
 
Personal income  R1456.81 
Household income  R2987.60 
Income of other household members  R1543.44 
Age   40 
Gender (percentage female)  57.75% 
Race (percentage African)  63.4% 
Burial Society as only savings form  63.81% 
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The KMPS supports Porteous' findings in that membership of a burial society 
was by far the most popular form of savings reported in the survey. Almost 83% 
of all savers indicated that they made a contribution to a burial society. The 
mean age of members of burial society savers were almost five years older than 
the mean age of the KMPS respondents as a whole. Almost 64% of burial 
society savers indicated that their burial society contribution was their only form 
of savings. Race, personal income, household income and the income of other 
household members of burial society savers were pretty close to the means of 
the entire KMPS sampled.   
 





























































Although burial society saving levels as a percentage of total savings levels fell 
as income rose (as illustrated by figure 3), the percentage of burial savers as a 
percentage of total burial savers was greater in the higher income deciles than 
for the poorer deciles of the population. This indicates a fascinating trend in the 
savings of the KMPS data. More rich people save in burial societies than poor 
people. The common assumption that burial societies are for poor people only, is 
clearly false. However rich people have more diversified savings portfolios: i.e. 
they supplement their burial society savings with savings in a stokvel, bank or 
other savings schemes. 
 
Thompson and Posel (2002) define three kinds of burial societies: traditional, 
hybrid and modern. A traditional burial society has a similar structure to that of 
the stokvel. Members put money into a pool, when somebody dies funds is taken 
from that pool to pay for the funeral.  Like the stokvels there is a reciprocal 
relationship prevalent in such a framework, burial society members are not only 
a source of finance but they also attend the funerals and provide social support 
to the bereaved by preparing food and erecting tents etc (Roth, 2002:9-13).  
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In a "hybrid" burial society this social element is equally important. Similarly 
the burial society is also seen as a social club.  Members have regular meetings 
and wear a burial society uniform at both the meetings and the funerals. 
However in a hybrid burial society, rather than pooling funds, members 
contribute to a common formal financial insurance scheme where payouts are 
beyond the discretionary control of the members (Thompson and Posel 2002, 3). 
Modern burial societies are focused on a relatively young age group (twenty and 
thirty year olds) and do not view the social side of the burial society with the 
same importance. Members make individual contributions to a formal insurance 
fund, which is paid out at time of death. 
 
Payouts from a burial society come in two forms. Most societies pay out a fixed 
predetermined sum after the death of a loved one. The sum paid out often 
depends on the relationship between the burial society member and the 
deceased. A higher sum will be paid for the death of a spouse or a child as 
opposed to the payout for a cousin or extended family member. (Thompson 
Posel, 2002:4).  
 
Another form of burial society pays funeral costs according to the contribution 
that the member has paid to the burial societies. (Thompson and Posel, 5). These 
burial societies act similarly to a stokvel. Each month, members pool their fixed 
contributions, which are put into one specific member’s account and are held 
either in a bank or by a leading member in the society. Members are only able to 
access these funds in order to pay for the funeral. The risk of such a scheme is 
that a member's payout is dependant on their accumulated contributions. If they 
have only been members for a short time, the payout that a member can claim 





There is relatively little literature on informal savings in South Africa. In the 
literature that exists (Verhoef 2002, Buijs 1998) the prominence of stokvels has 
been relatively well documented.  A stokvel is a form of a rotating savings and 
credit association (ROSCA). Verhoef argues that stokvels are a characteristic of 
poor urban South Africa. Residents in poor areas may have a volatile income 
flow and thus form these social saving networks in order to guarantee some 
stability in their income (Verhoef 2002. 10). Saving and membership of a 
savings scheme such as a stokvel provides savers with a measure of economic 
security. Members of a stokvel contribute a predetermined amount to the stokvel 
on a regular basis for a period of time. At the end of the period, total savings are 
cashed up and shared among the members of the stokvel.  
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Two hundred and forty one people reported saving in a stokvel. Only 22% of 
this number indicated that stokvels were their only savings form. Interestingly, 
race was the only striking feature of stokvel savers. Almost 95% of stokvel 
savers were African. This would indicate that stokvels form part of the social 
fabric of the African community in the KMPS area. The relatively low 
percentage of people who only saved in stokvels indicates that savers 
supplement their stokvel savings with alternative savings forms. This would be 
consistent with the findings of graph 1 that indicated that stokvel savings as a 
proportion of total personal savings remained relatively constant across income 
levels, even though there were more stokvel savers in higher income deciles. 
Thus unlike burial society members who only supplemented their burial society 
savings with alternative savings when they got richer, stokvel savers supplement 
















Rather than earning interest from a bank, some stokvels act as a communal bank 
themselves by lending money out to members and member's friends. By doing 
  Mean 
Personal income  R1497.15 
Household income  R2721.08 
Income of other household members  R1248.71 
Age   36 
Gender (percentage female)  69.70% 
Race (percentage African)  94.6% 
Stokvel as only savings form (%)  22%  
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this stokvel members are able to gain a higher return than what they would get 
from a bank. However they do face the greater risk of borrowers defaulting on 
their loans. In times of emergencies, members can borrow from the pooled funds 
at an interest rate lower than that which they can get elsewhere. Membership of 
such a scheme enables savers to earn interest by lending money out to its 
members or people known to its members. In this case the risk of default is 
small as the borrowers’ credit risk is known to the members of the stokvels. 
Thus although members do not save money in a bank they can accrue interest 
(Moyo et al, 2002:11). Membership of a stokvel may also provide sufficient 
money for an 'opportunity' expenditure whereby members gain access to enough 
capital for an income generating investment like a spaza shop or shebeen, thus 
hopefully reducing their exposure to future expenditure shocks (Verhoef 2002; 
11). 
 
In sum: members of stokvels are able to take out loans from the savings of the 
stokvel at a lower interest rate than that which they would be able to get at a 
bank. There are two reasons for the lower interest rates; the other members of 
the stokvel know the borrower and thus the risk premium on the borrower 
defaulting on the debt is smaller, and the operating costs of a stokvel are far 
smaller than that of a commercial bank. Banks recuperate their operating costs 
through the interest rate which pushes up the cost to borrowers (de Kock 1998).  
Borrowers from the stokvels pay for the interest lost on the savings amount as 
well as some small premium. Usually the amount needed to borrow is smaller 
than that which they can get from a bank loan (i.e. R100).  
 
Amounts smaller than R10 000 are exempt from the minimum interests rates 
stipulated by the Usury Act (Meagher and Wilkinson 2001). This means that 
people borrowing small amounts of money from microlenders face high interest 
charges. Stokvels provide a more affordable alternative than microlenders for 
borrowers who need access to a relatively small sum of money at a lower 
interest rate. Although microlenders who have become members of the 
Microfinance Regulatory Council (MFRC) have a cap of 26% per annum on 
loans of less than R10 000, many microlenders in the poor communities are not 
regulated by the MFRC and have no restriction on the interest that they can 
charge. Members of stokvels do not charge excessive interest, as they know they 
will also be subject to similar interest rate requirements when the time comes for 
them to borrow money. 
 
Stokvels are community based. There is communal peer pressure for members to 
adhere to their savings obligations, and defaulters are known throughout the 
community (Moyo et al, 2002. 11). Each stokvel has a secretary or principal 
who is in charge of collecting the money and keeping records of who has 
borrowed money and when it is due (Buijs 1998; 59). Stokvels have an incentive  
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to remain small in order to reduce the risk of debt default and in order for 
members to keep track of where their capital has been allocated.  
 
The longer the borrower has been a member of the scheme, the larger is the sum 
that they can borrow. Members are able to borrow at a lower interest rate than 
non-members. There is an incentive to maintain their repayments as those 
members who are deemed credit- worthy would have access to bigger loans in 
the future (Verhoef 2002.12). The debtor usually has between one and three 
months in which to pay back the money. Stokvels are based on a reciprocal 
saving relationship. Members pay their periodic dues as this allows them to be 
part of the saving cycle. Default dismisses them from the stokvel and stops them 
from receiving future pooled lump sums (Verhoef, 2002: 20). 
 
Current members can only accept new members through nomination. Because 
members are known to each other, the risk assessment and management of the 
stokvel's savings is that much easier and cheaper than it would be for a formal 
commercial bank to provide. Membership of a stokvel provides an incentive for 
people to save as they can get a real return from their money, which they would 
not be able to generate individually.   
 
Some stokvels do not pool savings over a period of time in order to earn interest. 
Rather, members contribute a fixed minimum amount to a fund every period. 
This pool of money is then given to one member for that particular period. Each 
member then takes it in turn to receive the pooled money (Buijs, 1998: 55 -56). 
For example in some stokvels, members contribute R50 to the scheme each 
month. If there are 12 members in the stokvel, each member can thus expect to 
receive R600 during one month of the year. The advantage of such a scheme is 
that when it is their turn to receive the pooled money members can buy goods 
that they would not normally be able to afford with their usual monthly income. 
 
This arrangement goes against the predictions of economic theory. People who 
participate in this form of stokvel get exactly the same payout they would get if 
they put a fixed sum of money under their mattress each month (and without the 
risk of losing savings if the stokvel arrangement fails). Yet stokvels are seen to 
be a relatively popular savings form at all levels of income. Perhaps the value of 
a stokvel is that it exposes individuals to a social pressure than ensures that they 
save rather than spend. In Moyo et al (2002) one respondent said,’ “Its always 
easier to save as a group, if on my own I would just blow the money or would 
sometimes not feel obliged to put aside something”. Thus peer pressure is 
probably an integral component of the popularity of stokvels.  
 
Gooi-goois are saving clubs in the Western Cape with a similar structure to that 
mentioned above. Members hold parties every period, usually monthly, in which  
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they pool their money. This pool is allocated to a particular member each period. 
However there is no predetermined amount that the members have to contribute. 
A record is kept of each member's contribution to the gooi-gooi. When it is a 
particular member's turn to receive the pool, their contribution history is read out 
to the other members who pay into the pool that he or she is to claim. This is an 
interesting reciprocal lending relationship whereby each member has an 
incentive to contribute generously to the scheme, as he or she will want the 
others to do the same when it is his or her turn to claim the pool (de Kock, 
1998).  
 
This review shows that there are different kinds of stokvel arrangements. 
Unfortunately the KMP survey did not ask sufficiently detailed questions to 
enable researchers to distinguish between the different kinds. The data on 
stokvels is thus an aggregate figure which includes all stokvels and gooi-goois in 
the same variable. 
 
     
7. Bank  Savers 
 



















































Four large banking groups dominate the South African banking industry: First 
Rand Limited, ABSA, Stanbic and Nedcor. The lack of competition in the 
industry has been blamed by some commentators for the slow roll out of 
banking services to the poor. (Meagher and Wilkinson 2001). In the past, the 
provision of banking services has been focused on the higher income (largely) 
white minority. They have benefited from a broad ATM network and a wide 
range of banking products that has made banking easy to access and efficient 
(Paulson et al, 2000:4).  
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Table 8:  Statistics of KMPS bank savers 
 
 Mean 
Personal income  R2225.38 
Household income  R4137.73 
Income of other household members  R3103.1 
Age   35 
Gender (percentage female)  45% 
Race (percentage 'African’)  76% 
Banks as only savings form  29.27% 
  
 
Three hundred and eighty people in the KMPS indicated having positive banks 
savings. Figure 5 shows that within the KMPS, the majority of the bank savers 
came from the higher income deciles. Bank savers were predominantly male 
which would reconfirm the earlier hypothesis that gender differences are 
reflected in income levels.  
 
The most substantial infiltration of the banking industry into the lower income 
sector of the South African economy has been through the provision of payroll 
services to South African companies. This has been relatively profitable as firms 
have preferred to move away from paying cash to their workers because of the 
high crime rate and the administrative burden (ibid 5). But as the economies of 
poorer communities are cash based, this service does not extend to them and 
they are not viable markets for the South African banks.  
 
The South African banking sector has been heavily criticised for not providing 
the poor with sufficient saving facilities. Indeed the high transaction costs 
associated with banking services have been viewed by the left as a deliberate 
way of channelling the poor out of the formal economy (Cosatu, 1999: 4; 2002: 
3). 
 
The South African Congress of Trade Unions and the South African Communist 
Party have been campaigning and lobbying government, to ensure that the poor 
are provided with adequate banking services, affordable credit for low cost 
housing and to put structures in place for small scale South African banks. These 
organisations argue that because the poor are not being provided with regulated 
financial services, they are being driven to unregulated micro lenders who trap 
them into poverty. A further criticism has been that while banks have focused 
their resources on the high-end upper income segment of the market they have 
largely ignored the poor. In their submission to the parliamentary hearings on 
bank charges, microlending and the Usury Act, Cosatu complained that South  
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African banks had opened more branches offshore than they had in South 
African townships (Cosatu, 1999:21). 
    
South African banks require relatively high deposits to open a bank account and 
those that do offer banking facilities to poor people charge higher transaction 
fees. Banks, of course, make their money through their control of the deposits 
they hold, thus lower deposit levels are relatively more expensive to administer 
than higher ones. They compensate for the lower profit margins of small 
deposits by charging relatively higher transaction fees. Administration costs are 
also higher as the majority of poor customers transactions are cash based and 
cannot be dealt with electronically. A further criticism of the banking system has 
been the difference between the bank's lending rate and their deposit rate. 
 
Standard Bank has tried to overcome the low deposit rates by offering bonuses 
and competitions to E plan account holders who hold more than R250 in their 
account for six months or longer. Yet still the transaction fees for the E plan 
account are substantially higher than what they charge for most of their other 
accounts. Similarly there is a clear contrast between the rates Nedbank charges 
for account holders with more than R3000 in their account and those with less 
than R3000. Taking into account that the lowest 60% percent of the households 
in the KMPS earned less than R3025 a month, the complaint that the banks are 
ignoring the poor seems to have some merit. 
 
 
8.  Savers and savings: A conclusion 
 
Because burial society contributions were such a dominant savings form, it was 
of interest to see whether Logistic models could confirm that the characteristics 
of people who saved in burial societies were different to those who saved in the 
other savings forms. As discussed earlier contributions to a burial society is a 
means of insuring against a predictable life-cycle shock (i.e. death). Other forms 
of savings can be seen as foregone consumption today in order to have greater 
consumption tomorrow, in lay-man terms an ‘investment’.  
 
Two more binary dependant variables were constructed, ‘burial society saver’ 
(burial society saver =1 if burial society savings >0) and ‘investment saver’ 
(investment saver =1 if personal savings – burial society savings >0). Each of 
these variables was run against various independent variables in the same 
categories that were deemed important in the Logistic model reported earlier. 
There was no need to run a controlled Logistic model as the household variables 
that were proven to be influenced by neighbourhood effects, were discarded 
when these two additional Logistic models were constructed. An additional  
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variable, burial society member was added to the ‘investment saver’ Logistic 
model. This was done in order to see whether respondents who were burial 
society members were more likely to have investment savings than those who 
did not save in a burial society. 
 
The results of the two additional Logistic models can also be seen on pages 40-
41. These models indicated that there were definite differences between the 
characteristics of those who saved in burial societies and of those who saved in 
stokvels banks or other ‘investment’ savings forms. 
 
The Pseudo R
2s were the most obvious indication of this difference. Using this 
as an indication of goodness of fit, the model for the burial society proved to be 
significantly poorer than that for the investment savings. This meant that the 
influence of those who saved in burial societies weakened the overall personal 
savings Logistic model. Gender and age were insignificant determinants of the 
probability that a person had investment savings or not. Years of education were 
a significant factor in determining the probability that a respondent had 
investment savings. The model predicted that the odds of a person having 
investment savings increased by 10%for every extra year of education that they 
received.  Africans were predicted to be 2.43 higher odds of having investment 
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Most interesting was the influence that savings in burial societies had on the 
probability that one saved in alternative savings forms. Being a member of a 
burial society had a strong positive relationship on the likelihood that one had 
savings in alternative forms. The model predicts that the odds of burial society 
members having investment savings were almost two times greater. This finding 
backs up earlier inferences that respondents to the KMPS saved in burial 
societies first and foremost. Only after they had saved in a burial society did 
they save in alternative savings forms. This hypothesis would explain why burial 
society savings take up a greater proportion of total savings for people in the 
lower income deciles of the population and why bank savings as a proportion of 
total savings rose as income increased. 
 
Although the model was poorer than the other two, the Logistic model for burial 
savers had some key implications. As expected, age was a significant variable. 
Those that had completed their secondary schooling were expected to be less 
likely to save in a burial society.  This was seen to indicate that a more 
sophisticated 'monetary' knowledge may have deterred people from savings in a 
burial society. The model predicted that having casual work was an insignificant 
determinant on the decision to have investment savings. Yet those that had 
casual work were predicted to have 80% higher odds of saving in burial 
societies than those who were not formally employed. 
 
The OLS model and the three Logistic models could not support the hypothesis 
that the 238 people who reported having no personal income yet had positive 
savings were taking money out of the household income pool. Personal income 
remained a significant determinant of both the decision to save at all and the 
level of savings. However, other personal characteristics such as race or gender 
and the sources of formal employment had a far stronger influence on the 
probability that one saved than the level of personal income. The Logistical 
models proved that personal income had a far stronger relationship with the 
levels of savings (as indicated by the OLS model) rather than the decision to 
save at all.  
 
By constructing the two additional Logistic models a far clearer understanding 
of the determinants of savings in the Khayelitsha and Mitchells Plain could be 
reached. A key step in clarifying the issue of savings of the poor was realising 
that burial societies and other savings forms serve different functions in the 
society.  
 
Analysing the savings rates and characteristics of savers in Khayelitsha and 
Mitchells Plain proved to be a complicated process that requires more in depth 
investigation. The role that stokvels and burial societies have in forming the 
social structure of poor communities deserves closer scrutiny. Ordinary  
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economic theories about savings fail to explain fully why poor urban South 
Africans choose to save in the manner that they do. 
 
Even in circumstances of unemployment and low personal income levels, 
respondents to the KMPS do save albeit in small amounts.  Reciprocal saving 
and lending arrangements and the sharing of household income are all means of 
smoothing out life-cycle shocks for individuals who have no other way of 
preparing for these events, which they could not afford to deal with on their 
own. Formal saving methods like banks are only accessible to the well off, 
however as this study indicates the poor work within these constraints to find 
ways to save. Given the substantial body of literature on the South African poor, 
it is surprising that so little has been written on the savings behaviour of low- 
income people. Poor South Africans are surviving life-cycle shocks under harsh 
economic circumstances. Pure economic theory may be too narrow to explain 
fully the methods and motivations behind the savings of the South African poor. 
A broader perspective that brings in other social sciences may be the only way 
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Appendix A: Stata do Files: 
 





gen bonuspay =. ; 
gen extracheque=. ; 
replace extracheque=(e18_1_2/12); 
replace extracheque=0 if (e18_1_2)==.; 
 
gen pieceratepay=. ; 
replace pieceratepay= e18_2_2; 
replace pieceratepay= 0 if e18_2_2 ==. ; 
 
gen profitshare=. ; 
replace profitshare= e18_3_2; 
replace profitshare=0 if e18_3_2 ==. ; 
 
replace bonuspay= e18_4_2; 
replace bonuspay= 0 if e18_4_2==. ; 
 
gen productivitypay=. ; 
replace productivitypay= e18_5_2; 
replace productivitypay= 0 if e18_5_2 ==. ; 
 
gen extrapay=. ; 
replace extrapay= productivitypay + profitshare+ pieceratepay +  
extracheque + bonuspay; 
 
*Extra Pay 2*/ 
#delimit; 
gen bonuspay2 = . ; 
gen extracheque2=. ; 
replace extracheque2=(e45_1_2/12); 
replace extracheque2=0 if e45_1_2==. ; 
 
 
gen pieceratepay2=. ; 
replace pieceratepay2= e45_2_2; 
replace pieceratepay2= 0 if e45_2_2 ==. ; 
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gen profitshare2=. ; 
replace profitshare2= e45_3_2; 
replace profitshare2=0 if e45_3_2 ==. ; 
 
replace bonuspay2= e45_4_2; 
replace bonuspay2= 0 if e45_4_2==. ; 
 
 
gen productivitypay2=. ; 
replace productivitypay2= e45_5_2; 
replace productivitypay2= 0 if e45_5_2 ==. ; 
 
gen extrapay2=. ; 
replace extrapay2= productivitypay2 + profitshare2 + pieceratepay2 +  
extracheque2 + bonuspay2;  
 
gen totalextrapay = .; 
replace totalextrapay= extrapay+extrapay2; 
 
replace totalextrapay =. if e9< e16; 
replace totalextrapay =. if e36<e43; 
replace totalextrapay =. if e43>1750 | e16>1750; 
 
 
/*Self employment profit*/ 
 
gen selfprofit=. ; 
replace selfprofit = g13_8; 




/* Survey only considers income of past month - not a good proxy for 
average monthly income*/  
gen casualpay=. ; 
replace casualpay=. if casualpay==3900; 
  
replace casualpay= i15 ; 
replace casualpay=0 if i15==0 ; 
replace casualpay=0 if i15==. ; 
 
gen casualworker=.; 
replace casualworker=0 if casualpay==0;  
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replace casualwork=1 if casualpay>0; 
label define casualwork 1"positive casual work income" 0"no reported 
casual work income"; 
label values casualwork casualwork; 
 
gen giftincome=. ; 
replace giftincome = (l15_1_1+l15_2_1+ l15_3_1) ; 
replace giftincome = 0 if (l15_1_1+l15_2_1+ l15_3_1)==. ; 
 
gen investmentincome=. ; 
replace investmentincome= ( l16_1_1 + l16_2_1 + l16_3_1) ;  






gen statepension =.; 
replace statepension= l13_1_1; 
replace statepension = 0 if l13_1_1 ==. | l13_1_1 ==0 ; 
 
gen disability=. ; 
replace disability= l13_2_1 if l13_2_2==3|l13_2_2==. ; 
replace disability= 0 if l13_2_1==. | l13_2_1==0 ; 
 
gen vetpension=. ; 
replace vetpension= l13_3_1 if l13_3_2==3| l13_3_2==.; 
replace vetpension= 0 if l13_3_1==. | l13_3_1==0 ; 
 
gen employerpension=. ; 
replace employerpension= l13_4_1 if l13_4_2 ==3| l13_4_2==.; 
replace employerpension= (l13_4_1/2) if l13_4_2 ==4; 
replace employerpension= 0 if l13_4_1==.  |l13_4_1==0 ; 
 
gen workercompensation=. ; 
replace workercompensation= l13_5_1 if l13_5_2==3 | l13_5_2==.; 
replace workercompensation= (l13_5_1/2) if l13_5_2==4; 
replace workercompensation= 0 if l13_5_1==0 | l13_5_1==. ; 
 
gen statechildsupport=. ; 
replace statechildsupport= l13_7_1 if l13_7_2 ==3|  l13_7_2==.; 
replace statechildsupport= (l13_7_1/2) if l13_7_2 ==4; 
replace statechildsupport= 0 if l13_7_1 ==. | l13_7_1==0;  
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gen privatechildmaintenance=. ; 
replace privatechildmaintenance= l13_8_1 if l13_8_2 ==3| l13_8_2==.; 
replace privatechildmaintenance= (l13_8_1/2) if l13_8_2 ==4; 
replace privatechildmaintenance= 0 if l13_8_1==. | l13_8_1==0 ; 
 
gen fostercare=. ; 
replace fostercare= l13_9_1 if l13_9_2 ==3|l13_9_2==.; 
replace fostercare= (l13_9_1/2) if l13_9_2 ==4; 
replace fostercare=0 if l13_9_1 ==. | l13_9_1==0; 
 
gen alimony=. ; 
replace alimony= l13_10_1 if l13_10_2==3|l13_10_2==.; 
replace alimony= (l13_10_1/2) if l13_10_2==4; 
replace alimony= 0 if l13_10_1==. | l13_10_1==0; 
 
gen UIF=.; 
replace UIF = l13_6_1 if l13_6_2 ==3| l13_6_2==.; 
replace UIF = (l13_6_1/2) if l13_6_2==4; 
replace UIF = 0 if l13_6_1==. | l13_6_1==0;  
 
generate float grantincome= statepension +disability +vetpension 
+employerpension+ workercompensation 




replace allgrant=1 if statepension>0; 
replace allgrant=2 if disability>0; 
replace allgrant=3 if vetpension>0; 
replace allgrant=4 if statechildsupport>0; 
replace allgrant=5 if fostercare>0; 
replace allgrant=6 if workercompensation>0; 
replace allgrant=7 if employerpension>0; 
replace allgrant=8 if privatechildmaintenance>0; 
replace allgrant=9 if alimony>0; 
 
label define allgrant 1"state pension" 2"disability" 3 "veterans pension"4 
"state child support grant" 5 " foster care grant" 6"workers compensation" 
7" employer's pension"8"private child maintenance" 9 "alimony"; 
label values allgrant allgrant; 
 
replace grantincome=. if grantincome==29000;  
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gen basicwage1 =. ; 
replace basicwage1 = e9 if e8==4; 
replace basicwage1= e9*2 if e8==3; 
replace basicwage1=e9*4 if e8==2; 
replace basicwage1= e9*20 if e8==1; 
replace basicwage1= 0 if e9==. ; 
replace basicwage1= e9 if e8==.; 
replace basicwage1=0 if basicwage1==.; 
 
gen basicwage2=. ; 
replace basicwage2= e36 if e35==4; 
replace basicwage2= e36*2 if e35==3; 
replace basicwage2= e36*4 if e35==2; 
replace basicwage2= e36*20 if e35==1; 
replace basicwage2=0 if e36==. ; 
replace basicwage2= e36 if e35==.; 
replace basicwage2=0 if basicwage2==.; 
 
gen totalbasicwage =. ; 
replace totalbasicwage= basicwage1 + basicwage2; 
 
/*Overtimepay*/ 
/*overtime of last month seems poor proxy better to use average weekly 
overtime*/ 
 
gen overtimepay=. ; 
replace overtimepay = (e16*e17); 
replace overtimepay=0 if overtimepay== .; 
replace overtimepay= 0 if (e16*e17)==.; 
 
gen overtimepay2=.; 
replace overtimepay2= (e43*e44); 
replace overtimepay2= 0 if (e43*e44)==.; 
 
gen totalovertimepay =. ; 
replace totalovertimepay = overtimepay + overtimepay2; 
replace totalovertimepay= 0 if (overtimepay +overtimepay2) ==.;  
 
/*personalincome*/  
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gen personalincome=. ; 
replace personalincome = giftincome + totalbasicwage + 
totalovertimepay 
 + selfprofit + casualpay+ totalextrapay + grantincome + 
investmentincome ; 
replace personalincome= 0 if (giftincome + totalbasicwage + 
totalovertimepay 




replace wageincome= totalbasicwage+ totalovertimepay+ totalextrapay; 
 
xtile incomequintile = personalincome if personalincome>0, nq(10); 
sort  incomequintile; 
by  incomequintile:sum personalincome; 
 
sort hhid pcode; 
merge hhid pcode using  "C:\Survey Datasets\African Datasets\South 
African  Datasets\Khayelitsha Mitchell's Plain Survey 
2000\stata\householdmodule_All_07_07_dist.dta"; 
 




replace l1=1 if l2>0 &l2<.; 
replace l3=1 if l4>0 & l4<.; 
replace l5=1 if l6>0 & l6<.; 
replace l7=1 if l8>0 & l8<.; 
 
replace l1=2 if l2==0; 
replace l3=2 if l4==0; 
replace l5=2 if l6==0; 
replace l7=2 if l8==0; 
 
replace l2=0 if l2==.; 
replace l4=0 if l4==.; 
replace l6=0 if l6==.; 
replace l8=0 if l8==.; 
 
replace l1=1 if l1==. | l2>0; 
replace l3=1 if l3==. | l4>0;  
   39
replace l5=1 if l5==. | l6>0; 
replace l7=1 if l7==. | l8>0; 
replace l1=2 if l1==.|l2==0; 
replace l3=2 if l3==. | l4==0; 
replace l5=2 if l5==. | l6==0; 
replace l7=2 if l7==. | l8==0;   
 
gen savestatus =.; 
replace savestatus =0 if l1==2 &l2==. | l2==0 & l3==2 & l4==. | l4==0  
& l5==2 &l6==. | l6==0 & l7==2 &l8==. | l8==0; 
replace savestatus=1 if l1==1 & l2>0 & l2<.& l3==2| l3==. &l5==2| l5==. 
& l7==2| l7==.; 
replace savestatus =2 if l3==1 & l4>0 & l1==2| l1==. &l5==2| l5==. & 
l7==2| l7==.; 
replace savestatus =3 if l5==1 & l6>0 & l1==2| l1==. &l3==2| l3==. & 
l7==2| l7==.; 
replace savestatus =4 if l7==1 & l8>0 & l1==2| l1==. &l5==2| l5==. & 
l3==2| l3==.; 
replace savestatus=5 if l1==1 & l2>0 & l3==1 & l4>0 &l5==2| l5==. & 
l7==2| l7==.; 
replace savestatus=6 if l1==1 & l2>0 & l5==1 & l6>0 &l3==2| l3==. & 
l7==2| l7==.; 
replace savestatus=7 if l1==1 & l2>0 & l7==1 & l8>0 &l3==2| l3==. & 
l5==2| l5==.; 
replace savestatus=8 if l3==1 & l4>0 & l5==1 & l6>0 &l1==2| l1==. & 
l7==2| l7==.; 
replace savestatus=9 if l3==1 & l4>0 & l7==1 & l8>0 &l1==2| l1==. & 
l5==2| l5==.; 
replace savestatus=10 if l5==1 & l6>0 & l7==1 & l8>0 &l1==2| 
l1==.&l2==0 & l3==2| l3==.&l4==0; 
replace savestatus=11 if l5==1 & l6>0 & l3==1 & l4>0 &l1==1& l2>0 & 
l7==2| l7==.&l8==0; 
replace savestatus=12 if l7==1 & l8>0 & l3==1 & l4>0 &l1==1& l2>0 & 
l5==2| l5==.& l6==0; 
replace savestatus=13 if l7==1 & l8>0 & l3==1 & l4>0 &l5==1& l6>0 & 
l1==2| l1==.& l2==0; 
replace savestatus=14 if l7==1 & l8>0 & l3==1 & l4>0 &l5==1& l6>0 & 
l1==1& l2>0; 
replace savestatus =15 if l1==. & l3==. & l5==. & l7==.; 
 
label define savestatus 0 "No savings" 1 "Stokvel only" 2"Burial society 
only" 3"Bank only"  
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4"Other savings only" 5"Stokvel and burial society" 6"Stokvel and bank" 
7" Stokvel and other savings" 
8 "Burial society and bank" 9"Burial society and other savings" 10"Bank 
and other savings"  
11 "Stokvel, bank and burial society" 12 "Stokvel burial society and other 
savings"  
13"Burial society, bank and other savings" 14"All saving forms" 15"All 
missing categories"; 
 
label values savestatus savestatus; 
 
/*Personalsavings and saver*/ 
 
gen stokvelsave = 0; 
replace stokvelsave =l2 if l2>0 & l2<.; 
 
gen burialsave=0; 
replace burialsave = l4 if l4>0 & l4<.; 
 
gen banksave=0 ; 
replace banksave =l6 if l6>0 & l6 <.; 
 
gen othersave=0; 
replace othersave = l8 if l8>0 & l8<.; 
 
gen personalsavings=0; 




replace saver =1 if personalsavings>0 & personalsavings<.& a1>=18 & 
a1<.; 
replace saver=0 if personalsavings==0 & a1>=18 & a1<.;  
 
gen banker=0; 
replace banker=1 if banksave>0 & banksave<.; 
replace banker =. if a1==.; 
 
gen stokvelsaver=0; 
replace stokvelsaver=1 if stokvelsave>0 & stokvelsave<.; 
replace stokvelsaver=. if a1==.; 
 
gen burialer=0 ;  
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replace burialer=1 if burialsave>0 & burialsave<.; 
replace burialer =. if a1==.; 
 
gen othersaver=0; 
replace othersaver=1 if othersave>0& othersave<.; 
replace othersaver=. if a1==.; 
 
 
*Monthly gross household income (derived)*/; 
sort hhid; 
egen hhincome=sum(personalincome),by( hhid); 
replace hhincome=. if personalincome==. & hhincome==0; 
 
*Monthly gross savings (derived)*/; 
sort hhid; 
egen hhsave=sum(personalsavings),by( hhid); 
replace hhsave=. if personalsavings==. & hhsave==0; 
 
gen hhsaver=.;  
replace hhsaver=1 if hhsave>0 & hhsave<.; 
replace hhsaver=0 if hhsave==0; 
 
* Other household savings */; 
gen otherhhsave =.; 
replace otherhhsave = (hhsave-personalsavings); 
 
*Other household income: Need to control for age */;  
gen otherhhincome = .; 
replace otherhhincome= (hhincome -personalincome); 
replace otherhhincome = hhincome if personalincome ==.; 
replace otherhhincome=. if a1==.; 
 
xtile hhincomequintile = hhincome if hhincome>0, nq(10); 
sort  hhincomequintile; 
by  hhincomequintile:sum hhincome; 
 
/*In these instances there is a bias towards the constructed hhincome 
variable 
by using the disclosed hhincome variable (q16) when hhsavings is 
greater than the hhincome variable  
this bias is avoided*/ 
 
replace hhsaver=. if hhsave>hhincome & hhsave>q16;  
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replace hhsaver=. if hhsave >hhincome & q16==.; 
replace saver =. if personalsavings>hhincome & hhsave >q16 ; 
replace saver=. if personalsavings>hhincome & q16==.;  
replace savestatus =. if personalsavings>hhincome & q16==.; 
 
sort hhid; 
egen hhgrant=sum(grantincome),by( hhid); 
replace hhgrant=. if grantincome==. & hhgrant==0; 
 
gen grantonly=0; 




egen hhburial=sum(burialsave),by( hhid); 
replace gen hhisaver=.; 
replace hhisaver=1 if hhisavings>0 & hhisavings<.; 
replace hhisaver=0 if hhisavings==0; 
 
*Investment Savings*/ 
gen isavings =.; 
replace isavings= (personalsavings - burialsave); 
 
gen isaver=.; 
replace isaver=0 if isavings==0 & a1>=18 & a1<.; 
replace isaver=1 if isavings>0 & isavings<.; 
 
gen burialpc=0; 
replace burialpc = (burialsave/personalsavings)*100; 
replace burialpc= . if a1==.; 
 
gen otherpc=0 ; 
replace otherpc= ( othersave/personalsavings)*100; 








replace stokvelpc=. if a1==.; 
  







by incomequintile: sum(burialpc); 
by incomequintile: sum(bankpc); 
by incomequintile: sum(stokvelpc); 
by incomequintile: sum(otherpc); 
 
xtile personalincomequintile = personalincome, nq(10); 
sort  personalincomequintile; 
by  personalincomequintile:sum personalincome; 
hhburial=. if burialsave==. & hhburial==0; 
gen hhburialpc =.; 




egen hhstokvel=sum(stokvelsave),by( hhid); 
replace hhstokvel=. if stokvelsave==. & hhstokvel==0; 
replace hhstokvelpc= ( hhstokvel/hhincome)*100; 
 
sort hhid; 
egen hhbank=sum(banksave),by( hhid); 
replace hhbank=. if banksave==. & hhbank==0; 
gen hhbankpc=.; 
replace hhbankpc= ( hhbank/hhincome)*100; 
 
sort hhid; 
egen hhother=sum(othersave),by( hhid); 
replace hhother=. if othersave==. & hhother==0; 
gen hhotherpc =.; 
replace hhotherpc = ( hhother/ hhincome)*100;  
 
gen hhisavings=.; 





gen gr4=0;  
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replace gr4=1 if a7==3 & a7!=999; 
gen gr6=0; 
replace gr6=1 if a7==6 & a7!=999; 
 
gen gr10=0; 
replace gr10=1 if a7==10 & a7!=999; 
 
gen gr12=0;  
replace gr12=1 if a7==12 & a7!=999; 
gen university=0; 
replace university=1 if a22==7; 
 
gen formaltraining=0; 
replace formaltraining=1 if a22<996 &a22>2; 
 
gen female=.; 
replace female=1 if gender==2; 




replace education=. if a7==999; 
 
/* Nicoli's labour market status categories*/ 
 
gen selfemployed=0; 
replace selfemployed =1 if lmstatus2==2; 
replace selfemployed =. if a1==.; 
 
gen wageemployed=0;  
replace wageemployed=1 if lmstatus2==1; 
replace wageemployed =. if a1==.; 
 
gen casualwork =0; 
replace casualwork=1 if lmstatus2==3; 
replace casualwork=. if a1==.; 
 
gen searchingunemploy=0; 
replace searchingunemploy=1 if lmstatus2==4 ; 
 
gen networksearch=0; 
replace networksearch=1 if lmstatus2==5; 
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gen marginalunemploy=0; 
replace marginalunemploy=1 if lmstatus2==6; 
 
gen nonlfparticipant=0; 
replace nonlfparticipant=1 if lmstatus2==7; 
 
gen incomeearner=0; 
replace incomeearner= 1 if lmstatus2>0 & lmstatus2<4; 





replace coloured =1 if race==2; 
replace coloured =0 if race==1 | race==3| race==4; 
 
gen african=.; 
replace african=1 if race==1; 









 The Centre for Social Science Research 






Davis, G.  2003 Bridges and Bonds:  List Proportional Representation (PR) and Campaigning in 
South Africa.  Cape Town, CSSR, Working Paper No. 50. 
 
Conradie, B.  2003 Labour, Wages and Minimum Wage Compliance in the Breërivier Valley Six 
Months after the Introduction of Minimum Wages.  Cape Town, CSSR, Working Paper No. 
51. 
 
Coetzee, C.  2003 Hiring Patterns, Firm-Level Dynamics and HIV/AIDS:  A Case Study of 
Small Firms on the Cape Flats.  Cape Town, CSSR, Working Paper No. 52. 
 
Stein, J., Soskolne, T. & K. Gibson 2003 Working with Ambivalence:  Finding a Positive 
Identity for HIV/AIDS in South Africa.  Cape Town, CSSR, Working Paper No. 53. 
 
Dieden, S.  2003 Integration into the South African Core Economy:  Household Level Covariates.  
Cape Town, CSSR, Working Paper No. 54. 
 
Bernstein, J.  2003 Car Watch:  Clocking Informal Parking Attendants in Cape Town.  Cape 
Town, CSSR, Working Paper No. 55. 
 
Booysen, F.   2003 The Role of Social Grants in Mitigating the Socio-Economic Impact of 
HIV/AIDS:  Evidence from the Free State Province.  Cape Town, CSSR, Working Paper 
No. 56. 
 
Booysen, F.  2003 Migration in the Context of the HIV/AIDS Epidemic:  Evidence from the 
Free State Province.  Cape Town, CSSR, Working Paper No. 57. 
 
Keswell, M.  2003 Employment, Group Membership and Risk-Pooling Behaviour:  Field 





The Centre for Social Science Research 
 
The CSSR is an umbrella organisation comprising five units:  
 
The Aids and Society Research Unit (ASRU) supports quantitative 
and qualitative research into the social and economic impact of 
the HIV pandemic in Southern Africa.  Focus areas include:  the 
economics of reducing mother to child transmission of HIV, the 
impact of HIV on firms and households; and psychological 
aspects of HIV infection and prevention.  ASRU operates an 
outreach programme in Khayelitsha (the Memory Box Project) 
which provides training and counselling for HIV positive people 
 
The Data First Resource Unit (‘Data First’) provides training and 
resources for research.  Its main functions are: 1) to provide 
access to digital data resources and specialised published 
material; 2) to facilitate the collection, exchange and use of data 
sets on a collaborative basis; 3) to provide basic and advanced 
training in data analysis; 4) the ongoing development of a web 
site to disseminate data and research output.    
 
The Democracy in Africa Research Unit (DARU) supports students 
and scholars who conduct systematic research in the following 
three areas:  1) public opinion and political culture in Africa and 
its role in democratisation and consolidation; 2) elections and 
voting in Africa; and 3) the impact of the HIV/AIDS pandemic on 
democratisation in Southern Africa. DARU has developed close 
working relationships with projects such as the Afrobarometer (a 
cross national survey of public opinion in fifteen African countries), 
the Comparative National Elections Project, and the Health 
Economics and AIDS Research Unit at the University of Natal. 
 
The Social Surveys Unit (SSU) promotes critical analysis of the 
methodology, ethics and results of South African social science 
research. One core activity is the Cape Area Panel Study of 
young adults in Cape Town.  This study follows 4800 young people 
as they move from school into the labour market and adulthood.  
The SSU is also planning a survey for 2004 on aspects of social 
capital, crime, and attitudes toward inequality. 
 
The Southern Africa Labour and Development Research Unit 
(SALDRU) was established in 1975 as part of the School of 
Economics and joined the CSSR in 2002.  SALDRU conducted the 
first national household survey in 1993 (the Project for Statistics on 
Living Standards and Development).  More recently, SALDRU ran 
the Langeberg Integrated Family survey (1999) and the 
Khayelitsha/Mitchell’s Plain Survey (2000).  Current projects 
include research on public works programmes, poverty and 
inequality.  
 
 
 